[A new mobile operating system is born. Telefonica and Mozilla have teamed up to deliver Open Web Devices. The ambition is high: displace the Apple/Google duopoly and commoditize app ecosystems. But can they do better than earlier attempts like WebOS? VisionMobile business analyst Stijn Schuermans sheds light on the challenging road ahead for this new platform candidate.] “People say that I’m a dreamer, but I am not the only one.” John Lennon Mozilla, the company behind Firefox (until recently the number two desktop browser) and top-5 mobile operator Telefonica are co-developing a new mobile operating system. The project is codenamed Boot2Gecko by Mozilla and devices running the OS are dubbed “Open Web Devices” by Telefonica. The goal is a phone that relies entirely on web technology and where all applications, from the dialler to games, are developed with HTML5. At the MWC 2012 conference in Barcelona, Mozilla ran a demo of Boot2Gecko on a Samsung Galaxy II, a high-end smartphone. At the same conference, Telefonica showed the new operating system on a low-end reference design from Qualcomm, which will become available on low-cost smartphones at a sub-Android price point. Mozilla also announced the Mozilla Marketplace, an app store for web apps. As explained in Christensen’s Innovator’s Dilemma, starting at the low end of the market is smart: the easiest way for Android device makers to protect their profitability is to leave the low margin devices to Open Web Devices and focus Android on higher-end devices, targeted at people who do have credit cards. This is the best way to disrupt Android. Google’s reaction will likely be lukewarm, as their interest is only in driving eyeballs to Google ads, which can be done perfectly from either platform. A disruptive strategy like this provides Telefonica with the opportunity to give Google a taste of its own medicine. Telcos are under big pressure from the application ecosystems of Apple and Google, which now own the customer relationship and are pushing down the value of the carriers to dumb bit pipes. If telcos are not full participants in the application ecosystem, then why not commoditize apps entirely? For Telefonica, Open Web Devices are an attempt to reduce the power of the major platforms and their vertical application silos by moving app development and distribution to a more “neutral” web-based environment. If applications are primarily developed in a cross-platform way, the platform’s power weakens. Mozilla is an ideal partner for telcos to achieve this, being a fundamentally not-for-profit organization with a mission to keep the Internet open and free. Mozilla and Telefonica are a good match in general for realising B2G as a competitor to Apple/Google; Mozilla can add the software foundations (APIs) and the developerecosystem around it, while Telefonica adds the OEM deals, monetisation and app store. On paper, Boot2Gecko could be the new web-based platform that succeeds where webOS failed; it is open source (unlike what webOS used to be), it has multiple OEM partners interested, it is backed by a top-5 telco and it comes at a time when HTML5 has technically evolved and enjoys widespread industry support. Indeed, B2G could be the champion that leads HTML5 from being an enabling technology to achieving full platform status. The reality is that a lot needs to be done for that to happen. In essence, the elements behind Telefonica’s Open Web Devices are not enough to win the hearts and wallets of consumers and developers: – Openness is a way to reduce developer marketing costs, but adds little value for end users. – Web is not a synonym for better user experience or the platform with which to appeal to games developers. – Devices running a web-based OS is a valid way to compete with Apple/Google, but a very expensive one, given that billions of dollars will have to be invested by Telefonica and handset OEMs before the OS reaches maturity and has a sizeable addressable market. Note that Microsoft is paying Nokia circa $1 billion a year to buy its way into an addressable market. For Boot2Gecko to succeed, it needs to compete with the other mobile platforms on all five key ingredients: 1. Software foundations, a rich set of APIs with managed fragmentation. Telefonica has already contributed a lot of the device API glue code to Boot2Gecko (based on the carrier’s earlier work within WAC). However, competing with iOS, Android and WP7 is a major long-term effort. 2. A developer ecosystem, to spur innovation and cater to diverse use cases. There are millions of web developers out there, who need to be “onboarded” onto B2G, i.e. on its specific APIs and app distribution system. 3. Devices & distribution, i.e. a large addressable market of 10s of millions of phones sold each year. As a top-5 telco, Telefonica is a major success factor here, but needs to translate OEM intentions (notably from LG who’s an early partner) into project investments and volume commitments. A positive factor here is that B2G is running on the same reference designs and based on the same kernel and core libraries – and so, quicker to bring to market than Windows Phone. 4. Monetisation. Monetisation is essential to the creation of a healthy developer ecosystem – and Telefonica intends to provide carrier billing. 5. Retailing. It is still unclear which partner will be responsible for providing  the on-device storefront, retailing and merchandising of apps to end users. To their credit, Telefonica and Mozilla are progressing fast with Boot2Gecko. The first experiments started in October 2010 and the project really kicked off in March 2011. The phone demonstrated in February 2012 wore all the key core apps (dialler, phonebook, inbox, etc.) and a UI experience that is claimed to be better than the lowest-end Android handsets. The handset demonstrated by Telefonica runs on the same hardware as the original iPhone 3G, but can be sold at 1/10th of the price according to our sources. This said, other contenders to the HTML5 platform crown, like Facebook Platform and Google Chrome, are already far more advanced in creating a viable ecosystem. Both Facebook and Chrome (the browser, the OS, but especially the web store) have already amassed substantial traction across screens and have solved at least some of the distribution, retailing and monetization challenges. The Mozilla Marketplace is a step in the right direction, but the organization has a lot of catching up to do. Moreover, there is an obvious and much cheaper substitute to these attempts to create web-app platforms that Telefonica and other telcos need to consider, if their goal is to disrupt the Apple/Google duopoly. Cross-platform development tools [see our full report – www.CrossPlatformTools.com] make it much easier for developers to reach multiple platforms and flatten the competitive landscape of Apple and Google’s ecosystems. In summary, Telefonica and Mozilla are making a very serious attempt at disrupting the current iOS/Android duopoly of application platforms. They do well to focus on low-end devices and to attack the link between apps and the platforms they run on. But using HTML5 technology or being open is not enough. Mozilla, in particular, has to prove that it can draw in web developers to this new platform and create a vibrant ecosystem. Telefonica not only needs to get OEMs enthusiastic, but also committed to produce phones in volume. Finally, it is unclear how this initiative can outrun the competition, Facebook and Chrome or whether Telefonica and Mozilla should instead invest in the alternative approach of cross-platform development tools. – Stijn Want to know more? VisionMobile offers deep insights into the HTML5 ecosystem and how it stands to disrupt the Apple/Google duopoly. Check out the latest research note in our CEO Trendwatch service (send an email to stijn@visionmobile.com for access), or our Mobile Innovation Economics workshop. #boot2gecko #operatingsystem #opensource #mobileinsider #mozilla

We are proud to announce the launch of Cross-Platform Tools 2012 – the free, industry-first report on cross-platform developer tools. You can download a free copy here. Cross-platform tools (CPTs) allow developers to create applications for multiple platforms with a small incremental cost. Their impact is both tactical in allowing developers to target more platforms, but also strategic in having the potential to disrupt the Apple/Google duopoly in mobile ecosystems. Our report is based on a 6-month project, comprising a large-scale online developer survey (nearly 2,500 respondents) combined with meticulous research, vendor interviews and analysis of this complex market of over 100 tools vendors. This report would not have been possible without the support of Marmalade, RunRev, Verizon Developer Communities, Xamarin and the many other companies behind this multi-sponsored project. Cross-platform tools (CPTs) solve real challenges today; they allow developers to create applications for multiple platforms – usually mobile, but increasingly tablets or TV screens – from almost the same codebase or from within the same design tool. CPTs reduce the cost of platform fragmentation and allow developers to target new platforms at a small incremental cost. More importantly, cross-platform tools allow software companies targeting multiple platforms to reuse developer skills, share codebases, synchronise releases and reduce support costs. Early leaders in the cross-platform tools space Our survey revealed that PhoneGap and Sencha lead in terms of mindshare, as they are currently used by 32% and 30% of cross-platform developers, irrespective of their primary tools. Completing the top-5 ranking of our Mindshare Index are Xamarin’s MonoTouch / Mono for Android, Appcelerator and Adobe (Flex). The second half of the top-10 CPTs in terms of current use are Unity, Corona, AppMobi, RunRev and MoSync. PhoneGap (23%), Xamarin Mono (22%) and Unity (22%) are the tools most developers plan to adopt, irrespective of their primary tool. This market is in constant flux, with developers experimenting and trying out new tools – for example PhoneGap is a stepping stone to cross-platform development as it leads Mindshare, IntentShare, but also comes third in the tools being abandoned. The most widely used CPT accounts for just half of the Mindshare seen in the iOS and Android platforms in our Developer Economics 2011 report. Cross-platform tools challenge the Apple/Google duopoly The real impact of cross-platform tools is strategic. Just as the Apple/Google duopoly began to look impenetrable in 2011, a major disruption is flattening the playing field for competitors like Microsoft’s WP7, RIM’s BlackBerry OS and Samsung’s Bada: cross-platform tools are letting developers target multiple platforms with low incremental costs and high levels of code reuse. 2012 marks an inflexion point in the war of mobile ecosystems where the network effects built by Apple and Google are being challenged by an unsuspected new entrant. Cross-platform tools (CPTs) make it easier for example for an iPhone developer to reach Android and Windows Phone 7 users. CPTs dilute network effects by allowing other ecosystems to compete not just in terms of the number of apps listed, but also the availability of top apps, the time-to- market (an app rarely appears at the same time across all platform app stores) and the overall app quality. Moreover, cross-platform tools reduce barriers to entry and democratise app development, by allowing developers from any language (HTML, Java, C++), any background (hobbyist, pros, agencies, corporates) and any skill level (visual designer to hard-core developer) to build mobile apps. The dozens of CPTs available cater to every developer segment, from creative designers to C++ gurus to hobbyist website enthusiasts to Fortune-500 CIOs. The result could be termed a “democratisation” of software development (in the words of Unity’s Dan Adams), in that mobile platforms may be opened up to all types of developers. Mergers, financings and the survival of the strongest We have identified over 100 cross-platform developer tools, in a market that’s booming with new players in 2011. Cross-platform tools have passed the “early adopter” phase, and are now moving into mainstream. For example vendor Sencha counts 1.6 million SDK downloads, Corona apps have reportedly been downloaded 35 million times in 2011, Unity reports 200,000 developers active each month, while Appcelerator boasts 35,000 apps published using the tool and deployed on 40 million devices. Since 2011, cross-platform tool vendors have raised major VC funding, have been acquired, or achieved major releases. In the CPT space we have tracked 10 acquisitions, and over US$ 200 million in funding rounds. This is a market that takes cash to survive: CPT vendors are subsidizing their entry to market with free products, based on ample VC funding. For example OpenPlug ceased operations as it failed to find a monetisation model, with its key challenge being the conversion of freemium users into paying customers for its support and professional services. CPT vendors without a compelling free product will be washed out by the competition. Cross-platform tools are taking HTML further than browsers can The purpose of HTML5 has been to extend the capabilities of web apps (those developed using HTML and JavaScript) to more closely match the capabilities of native apps. Despite performance disadvantages and fragmentation across different browser versions, HTML5 has emerged as the most widely supported authoring technology for cross-platform apps. Cross-platform tools are taking HTML further than web browsers can, by allowing web developers to create native smartphone apps. In other words, CPTs are taking HTML5 much further by unifying the authoring side- rather than the runtime side – of the app across platforms. Moreover, CPTs are paving the way for HTML5 to become not a platform, but the mainstream development technology for smartphone apps. Cross-platform tools are already triggering an influx of web developers; We found that 60% of CPT users, irrespective of their primary tool, have more than five years experience in web development. Indeed, cross-platform tools have triggered an influx of web developers into mobile. Android and Windows Phone have been constantly evolving, adding hundreds of new APIs from each major version to the next. Due to the rapid advancement of platforms, tools vendors will always be one or two steps behind in terms of features and access to the complete set of device capabilities. Developers that create demanding applications like 3D games or apps requiring intense user interaction, exceptionally deep user experience, or apps relying on specific features not available on all platforms will need to be developed using the native SDK. Cross-platform tools will therefore be complementary to native SDKs. Cross platform tools will become “business as usual” As the platform landscape remains fragmented for the foreseeable future, cross-platform tools will become “business as usual” The future of mobile development is multi-platform – fewer and fewer developers will be able to afford to be confined to a single platform with the limited user reach and monetisation opportunities that implies. The adoption of cross-platform tools is driven by the ability to reach masses of users, which is the primary consideration for most developer segments. Cross-platform tools are indeed the only cost-effective vehicle for these developers to reach a wide mass of users, and we expect CPT usage to become commonplace a result. Multi-screen and the evolving points of competition At the onset of 2012, CPT developer selection criteria are heavily skewed towards the breadth of platforms supported by each tool. This picture will change considerably as cross-platform tools vendors advance their products to cover all the major mobile platforms. We expect that by mid-2013, the platforms covered by a CPT will move from a point of differentiation to a point of parity. In that timeframe, we expect the points of competition to move to later stages of the app lifecycle, with vendors offering component marketplaces, end-to-end workflow tools, device adaptation tools, app publishing services and post-download services. In the sea of 100+ cross-platform tools, vendors are beginning to differentiate by targeting three distinct developer segments: those working on games, enterprise or media apps. Developers in these three segments face distinctly different challenges, work in distinctly different environments and as such need very different CPT solutions. As tool vendors try to survive in the “red ocean” of dozens of cross-platform tools, we expect CPTs to emerge for the financial sector, media publishers and the healthcare/medical sector. Multi-screen is the next frontier. The battle of the software ecosystems is raging across many screens – mobile, tablet, PC and soon smart TV devices – and multi-screen will be the next frontier for cross-platform tools. Already in our survey, 27% of respondents noted that they also target Windows PC and 24% target Mac desktops with their main cross-platform tool. However, the complexities of cross-platform development in a multi-screen environment are growing exponentially and beyond the simple sharing of the code between multiple platforms. Different screen types have different interaction models, input methods, screen sizes, go-to-market channels and pricing models, while developers working on different screens have use varying tool-chains, development cycles and collaboration processes. With the proliferation of users who own more than one connect screen, the next frontier for cross-platform tools will be multi-screen. Lessons to be learned Cross platform tools have previously faced criticism, most notably from Steve Jobs in his infamous open letter “Thoughts on Flash”. The next generation of tools are however rapidly coming to market or maturing with abundant backing from the financial and developer community. The cross-platform tools market is in a state of abundant volatility and we see continual flux, as developers try a tool, and then churn to a different one. This is a market with no clear winners or losers. It’s a market where there is little developer loyalty, and perceptions are still being formed. Now is the time for well-funded vendors with great tools to prove themselves and establish a firm beachhead. – Seth Follow us on Twitter – @visionmobile Download a copy of the report here. Interested in raw data from the report? Drop us a note #unity #xamarin #phonegap #runrev #marmalade #crossplatformtools #sencha #Adobe

The mobile market is evolving, as increasing smartphone penetration is quickly shifting the balance of power between the major players. Marketing Manager, Matos, examines the latest smartphone facts and figures and announces the winners and losers of the platform and handset race for 2011. Also presenting our latest 100 Million Club report – in infographic format! Quick facts on the rise of Android Moreover, Android’s share keeps growing, rising from 42% share in the first half of 2011 to a crushing 54% share in H2 2011. This level of pervasiveness has not been seen since Symbian’s heyday, but let’s not forget that Symbian didn’t have to face such stifling competition back then. In terms of ecosystems, while Android’s 350K apps are still lagging behind Apple’s 540+K available apps, there’s been an upset in the volume of downloads, bringing Android to the pole position. Due to a much larger installed base, Android’s downloads are growing exponentially and the Market will catch up to Apple’s number of cumulative downloads within a couple of years. Granted, a lot of these apps are Viber, Shazam and Angry Birds, but in any case Google’s business model is all about ads and an addressable audience, not device sales and downloads. Furthermore, the Android brand name is being bolstered by large marketing budgets that provide numerous ads, news items and mentions across all printed and digital media. Android has now become a household name, mainly thanks to the support and promotion of telcos and handset OEMs, who have managed to position the platform as the new and exciting operating system for users. Rivals to the smartphone throne Android’s number one rival right now, iOS, also enjoyed a very good year. In 2011, Apple climbed to the second position as a smartphone vendor behind Samsung with 19% share, although it’s a very close call between the two companies. In the fourth quarter, Apple exceeded all expectations and sold 37 million iPhones, claiming nearly 24% share in that quarter. It’s quite telling that in Q4, Apple sold 80% more handsets than its previous record of 20 million, in the second quarter of 2011. Although they’re still behind Samsung as a smartphone vendor, Apple is the clear winner in terms of both revenues and profits. Aided by the high sales of all iOS devices, including iPods and iPads, Apple raked in a 32 billion USD profit during 2011 – a figure comparable to the GDP of a small country. The question remains whether Apple will be able to repeat such a feat and continue this trend, taking market share away from platforms leaking market share, like Symbian and BlackBerry. The third mobile platform in terms of shipments for 2011 was Symbian. There’s not much to discuss on Symbian – its expiration date is coming soon and Nokia has to convert as many Symbian sales as possible to Windows Phone sales, as quickly as possible. However, Nokia had announced four new Symbian models in 2012, but they’re only releasing one. BlackBerry also finds itself in a quagmire, with declining market share, a decrease in share value from around $60 in Jan 2011 to as low as $16 in early 2012 underwhelming revenues and an underused ecosystem. Although RIM’s co-CEOs have stepped down and the company is under new leadership, this is a difficult boat to turn around and RIM is going to have to follow the simplest rule of all in mobile: innovate or die. Bada snatched the 5th position of the smartphone platform market away from Windows Phone, outselling Microsoft’s platform by nearly two to one. Samsung’s platform for low-end smartphone continues to turn heads and the company seems to have even bigger plans for bada. However, both bada and Tizen (Samsung’s new open source project) are unable to compete in terms of developer mindshare. But that’s fine, as the primary use for bada or Tizen to Samsung is as a negotiating leverage against Google’s Android. Last, but not least, we have Windows Phone as the sixth smartphone platform, with approximately 2% market share. Despite the fact that Windows Phone has been out for over a year now, Microsoft’s new mobile OS has so far met with lukewarm results – a fact commented upon by Microsoft’s Stephen Ballmer himself. Nokia’s new Lumia line has the potential to install Windows Phone in the upper echelons of the platform market, tapping the vibrant developer community that has sprung up around the platform, but there are still many risks and difficulties ahead. The fact of the matter is that WP’s chief rivals, Android and iOS, have the high ground in this battle of ecosystems and it’s never easy fighting uphill. The Android court The top 5 smartphone vendors in 2011, accounting for 42% of the total shipments [UPDATE: accounting for 75% of total smartphone shipments,] were Samsung, Apple, Nokia, RIM and HTC – out of these, two are (mostly) Android vendors. Although many Android vendors enjoyed a good year in 2011, it was Samsung that took the lion’s share. Samsung doubled their smartphone shipments in just six months, going from 32 million in H1 2011 to over 60 million in H2. Nearly 80% of those were Android shipments leaving Samsung as the single most important Android vendor in 2011. Samsung seems to have sold approximately one in three Android devices in 2011. HTC did reach many milestones during 2011, such as becoming the no1 smartphone vendor in the US during Q3, but its shipments declined in Q4 and are expected to decline even further in the first quarter of 2012. Other vendors who mainly ship Android smartphones, like Sony Ericsson, LG, Huawei and ZTE are indeed reporting an increased number of handset shipments, but they still have a lot of catching up to do. The big question for 2012 is how Google will play the Motorola card, with the deal having been green-lighted by authorities on both sides of the Atlantic. While some analysts have put forward the theory that Motorola will become a benchmark for Android handsets and will be used to keep in check other Android vendors, it’s quite likely that Google will choose a different path. Motorola’s acquisition is more closely linked to its patents, with the company’s 17 thousand patents more likely to be used as an insurance policy against Apple’s relentless legal onslaught. Android’s expansion continues Smartphone penetration continues to grow at an impressive pace; the smartphone market grew by 43% in 2011, from nearly 300 million shipments in 2010 to over 480 million in 2011. Penetration is expected to continue to increase and reach well into the 40% range during 2012. It’s highly likely that, at least for the time being, Android is going to continue expanding and maintaining its current high market share. What’s more important to Google, though, is getting Android on as many screens as possible. Android is already making an impact on the tablet market, rising from 29% market share at the end of 2010 to 39% at the end of 2011. While Android has a lot of ground to cover in this particular market, it’s slowly stealing market share away from the dominant iPad, while keeping other competing platforms, like QNX and Windows, at bay. Another big bet for Google is TV; Google goal is to get as many users as possible hooked on Android, across as many screens as possible. Feedback welcome, as always. – Matos (@visionmobile) #ios #bada #100millionclub #symbian #Android #windowsphone #Blackberry

[The launch of the Lumia line marks the pivotal point in the Microsoft-Nokia partnership. But how successful will it be? VisionMobile Strategy Director Michael Vakulenko voices his concerns about the partnership between Nokia and Microsoft.] [updated] Nokia and Microsoft are fighting two very different battles: Microsoft is trying to protect its aging PC software licensing business. Nokia, on the other hand, fights to survive as a as a handset manufacturer, hoping to see profits of the smartphone business. There is one thing in common, though: Both were disrupted by fundamental shifts in the mobile industry. The basis for competition in software and mobile has changed – the once-successful business models of Microsoft and Nokia can no longer ensure profitable growth. The partnership between the two companies cannot change that. Vic Gundotra of Google once cynically said that two turkeys don’t make an eagle. Or do they? Microsoft: A PC company in the mobile age Reports about “Microsoft making more money on Android than on Windows Phone”, make for a catchy headline, but miss the point. Microsoft’s mobile strategy is about reducing ecosystem churn, i.e. protecting revenues from Windows and Office licensing. Every iPhone or iPad sold, represents a user who might choose to move away from a PC or Office license. Every iPhone developer represents a developer who adds value to Apple ecosystem and not Microsoft’s. As of January of 2012, Microsoft Windows & Windows Live, Server & Tools and Business divisions were responsible for over 75% of the revenues, but, more importantly, practically all of the operating income. The company reported weaker than-expected PC demand in the last quarter of 2011. Revenue of Windows & Windows Live Division fell 6 percent year over year (and this is during the lucrative holiday quarter!), and yet worse – operating income declined by 11 percent. The company’s core business is challenged at multiple levels. iPhone and iPad users are increasingly choosing Mac as their next computer – Mac success means less Windows licensing revenues. Moreover, tablets are displacing netbooks and laptops, which were the hope of the PC industry until recently. Google and a slew of Internet startups are opening cracks in Microsoft Office defenses by pushing migration of productivity tools into the cloud.  The end result is ecosystem churn, which means less and less Windows and Office licenses sold. Microsoft badly needs to renew its growth. See this excellent analysis by Adam Hartung, Forbes. But, Windows Phone is a “loss leader”, not a growth engine. It’s daydreaming to expect that Windows Phone license revenues will be able to pay back all the investment that was made and is being made into the platform. Even at a $20 license fee. As reported in March 2010, the Windows Mobile R&D team headcount back in FY 2009 was 2,000 staff with a total OPEX of $900 Million. The numbers could only have grown since then. Partnering with a fast-declining Nokia buys Microsoft neither market share nor new revenue engines. First and foremost, Microsoft needs to establish significant market share for Windows Phone in North America — the hotbed of mobile innovation. However, Nokia is traditionally weak in North America in both market share and brand awareness. Plus the European reception of Lumia was lukewarm with slight above one million devices sold during the Christmas launch season. Instead of placing so much faith in the partnership with Nokia, Microsoft could have focused their efforts on a close alliance with the faster-moving Samsung as the key OEM for the Windows Phone platform. Microsoft will be challenged to find new growth engines. Up until now, Microsoft has been losing money in Internet and mobile. In the last quarter of 2011 alone, the company’s Online Services Division lost $458 Million adding to mounting multi-billion loses in the last six years (see this revealing Business Insider chart). Throwing boat-loads of money at mobile and Internet without a winning business model can only work for limited time for Microsoft. Mounting costs will inevitably raise the concerns of impatient investors over the viability of its mobile strategy. Nokia: a handset maker in the software age Apple has outpaced Nokia not only because of better products, but because it changed the basis of competition. The competition has changed from a competition of devices to a competition of software ecosystems. Nokia understood the challenge back in 2007, but in a classic case of Christensen’s Innovator’s Dilemma, was late to respond. Today, the mobile handset market is driven by owners of software ecosystems, companies like Apple, Google and Microsoft. The role of handset OEMs has been reduced to that of a foot solder in the broader battle between ecosystems. OEM business has become a commodity business, where OEMs have little room for differentiation, besides price. Since Nokia was slow in fostering its own software ecosystem, the company had little choice but to join Motorola, Sony-Ericsson, Samsung, LG, ZTE, Huawei and a host of smaller OEMs in the fierce “competition to the best”. Michael Porter calls competition to the best “the granddaddy of all strategy mistakes”. The partnership with Microsoft might not be able to save Nokia from the perils of commoditisation. Windows Phone is a very attractive product, but it arrived to the market two years late. Apple and Google had enough time to establish strong network effects for their iOS and Android platforms. These network effects between users and app developers ensure explosive growth, user lock-in and multi-billion dollar investments by developers (see our recent post on how platforms are not created equal). In these hyper competitive conditions, Windows Phone devices will be challenged to command premium prices – like it it not, Nokia will have to compete on price with Android devices. In retrospect, Nokia associated itself with a fledgling software ecosystem that is yet to build strong network effects. With both profitability and volumes in question, Nokia finds itself in a one-way street, depending on Microsoft to help support its smartphone business (see how Microsoft paid $250 Million to Nokia in Q4 2011). Given the new market conditions, Nokia’s real competition is not iPhone or Android, but Samsung.  Samsung is not only the largest, but also the most profitable Android OEM. Its true competitive advantage lies in its vertical integration across the most expensive smartphone hardware components: the display, application and baseband processors and memory. Samsung even owns the fabs that manufacture many of these components. Samsung’s superior business model has launched the company to the second place of the industry in terms of profit share, second only to Apple. Nokia’s business model of high-margin, branded OEM is in question and its dependency on Windows Phone alone is a weakness.  Nokia would be much better off if the company manufactured both Android and Windows Phone devices. Nokia, with its economies of scale and strong brand name, could auction placement of either OS to the highest bidder on its devices. Nokia is running out of time and Samsung is gaining market share eagerly. How soon will Microsoft need to knock on Samsung’s door offering to pay billions for promoting Windows Phone on millions of Samsung devices? Insisting on sailing upwind In this partnership, Nokia and Microsoft insist on sailing upwind with their sails flapping (those of you who’ve had any experience sailing will know how boring this can be). Combining two business models of the 1990’s won’t help the two companies regain their positions in the new world order, dominated by companies with Internet-age business models, like Apple, Google, Amazon and Facebook. As it seems, the only way out for Nokia and Microsoft would be the acquisition of Nokia’s smartphone business by Microsoft, as Andreas Constantinou predicted a year ago on this blog. — Michael [Michael Vakulenko is a Strategy Director at VisionMobile, where he focuses on mobile platform research and mobile ecosystem economics. Michael has been working in the mobile industry for over 16 years, starting his career in wireless in Qualcomm. Michael has a broad experience across many aspects of the mobile industry, including smartphone ecosystems, mobile services, handset software, wireless chipsets and network infrastructure. He can be reached at michael [/at/] visionmobile.com] #ios #comicstrip #nokia #Android #windowsphone #microsoft

[The golden era for telcos is slowly coming to an end, as they face increasing pressure from OTT (Over the Top) players, like Viber and Skype. Guest author Paul Golding assesses the disruption of Internet players to the telco industry and envisions the future of Voice] Carriers have built vast empires and generated piles of cash by doing what ‘it says on the tin’: carrying voice. Not long ago, their services were the only way to carry voice over wired or wireless connections. However, the internet changed the game. With affordable and fast enough data connections, plus the freedom to install their own apps in a growing base of smartphones (at around 35% of total handset shipments in Q4), users can pick-and-mix alternative voice solutions, like Skype, Vonage or Viber. Early Skype users would have experienced the mode of disruption documented by Clayton Christensen in his book Innovator’s Dilemma. Skype provided a low-cost (free) alternative to incumbent solutions, but with a fairly poor user experience characteristic of a disruptive early-stage technology. Sure, VoIP wasn’t that new, but as a downloadable offering to the masses via an ordinary household internet connection, it was. From Disturbance to Disruption As Christensen’s theories predicted, carriers mostly saw Skype as a minor disturbance, insufficient to warrant revision of their strategies.  But it marked a pivotal moment in the evolution of communications, which was the unbundling of voice from the carrier network. In other words, consumers can take their data connections from carrier X and their voice services from provider Y: Skype, Viber, or whomever. The industry refers to these unbundled services as “Over The Top” (OTT) solutions. However, the minor disturbance has become, well – disturbing – at least to some carriers. The modes of disruption have been aided by several key trends, in no particular order: Open (enough) device operating systems – Android and iOS More afforable data tariffs and speedier internet connections Dramatic lowering of barriers to entry for internet platforms of all kinds Consumer behavioural changes Increase in carrier inertia preventing timely responses to OTT threats These trends, and more, are covered extensively in my new book “Connected Services,” which, like this blog post, I wrote using my own “notes from the field” in the last 21 years of working in mobile generally, but the last 7 years specifically trying to evangelize Web paradigms to the boards and senior management of various carriers. Open Device Platforms = choice The consequence of open smartphone platforms is increasingly well understood. It enables users to choose how they want to experience their communications services. Viber is one of the best examples. It essentially replaces the standard dialer on the device with a custom one, not too dissimilar in experience, but enables calls to be placed for free via a data connection. During the catastrophic Java ME era, before Android, replacement of the dialer on the phone was unthinkable. That’s all changed. The iPhone still doesn’t quite enable a seamless replacement of the dialer, as it won’t run an alternative at “boot-up,” but Android certainly does. Mr Number, a Palo Alto start-up, are busy exploiting this fact to provide an alternative Android dialer that essentially “unbundles” the calling and messaging experience, initially to manage call and texting spam. However, as with all disruptive technologies, the initial service is only the thin edge of the disruptive wedge. It is easy to imagine plenty of powerful disruptive scenarios orchestrated by or between these types of solution, enough to push the carriers out forever. Faster, Cheaper Connections Better technology gives us more bits for less money. Here in the US, that trend has jumped dramatically with the widespread availability of 4G (LTE) connections and devices. There is a class of users today who don’t need to talk that much, or at all, and so can easily do so via their data bundle using an app like Viber. In other words, they don’t need any voice minutes. These are the early adopters who threaten to disrupt carriers by usurping the “Carrier X” experience with the “Viber experience” or the “Whatsapp” experience. That road leads to obscurity and eventual death no matter how loudly and often marketing say “we’ve got the brand.” Low-cost Low-friction Software Platforms The remarkable fact about Viber, Mr Number and other OTT apps is that they are built by tiny start-ups with comparatively little budget but stellar teams. These financial lightweights are busy stealing the core communications experience away from carriers who might spend more on a single TV ad than the budgets of many of these start-ups combined. The power of the developer has increased dramatically in the last few years and continues to grow. The proliferation of Software-, Platform and Infrastructure-as-a-Service products has lowered the barriers to entry to a point where any aspiring entrepreneur and a few developers can build services on tiny budgets that can challenge mighty carriers. Moreover, entirely new breeds of software platforms have arisen to meet the needs of start-ups with aspirations in the voice and messaging world. Twilio is the perhaps the most talked about example. They provide powerful voice and messaging APIs without investing a single cent in infrastructure. Upon visiting their offices in San Francisco, they took great delight in revealing their “sophisticated” infrastructure – a solitary and lonely router sitting in an otherwise empty wiring closet. It would be funny if it wasn’t so painfully true. Twilio is built using Amazon’s Web Services, as are so many start-ups these days, starting at only a few dollars a month! The emergence of a category of Communications-as-a-Service (CaaS) providers is an interesting development in the platforms market. Twilio were not the first. Companies like Voxeo were already there with services like Tropo.com, also offering powerful voice and messaging APIs with on-demand pricing to developers. I know that many of the well-known “darling” messaging start-ups in Silicon Valley are using Tropo “under the hood.” There are even companies specializing in API-enabling technologies, like apigee.com and developer-community design agencies, like AlphaPunk, such is the nature of software ecosystems. Shifts in Consumer Sophistication Blackberry Messenger, Whatsapp, Viber, Skype are no longer used by nerdy early adopters. Grandparents are using Skype to keep in touch with their grand kids. Indeed, a whole class of use cases has arisen just around Skype, from remote learning to baby-sitting. The tipping point for this shift has been the apps revolution, accelerated by the iPhone. Thanks to the marketing education of Apple and others (“there’s an app for that”), it is so easy to install an alternative service via the click of a button – one click and the “Carrier X” experience is toast! Increase in Carrier Inertia Relative to “born on the Web (2.0)” companies, carriers are the proverbial tortoise alongside the hare. They have exceptionally powerful voice and messaging apparatus, but not available in any form that enables innovation to happen. Contrary to what some might think, carriers are not dumb. This is a point explored well by Christensen in his analysis of companies who failed to respond to disruptive innovation – “these weren’t companies run by idiots.” However, carriers do have is inertia, aggravated by the following factors: Their IT systems are too complicated, lacking in agility and mostly deployed in tactical “stove-pipe” fashion. By the way, even early dot.com darlings, like Yahoo, have the same problem (perhaps counter-intuitively for so-called “Silicon Valley” companies). IT systems are managed by external vendors with typically long development cycle times. Carriers are NOT technology companies. They lack the software expertise of a Voxeo or Twilio, who build their own platforms. The necessarily risk-cleansed IT frameworks and paradigms can’t in any way support agile innovation, even if carriers wanted to (and some of them do). Running Across Quicksand Carriers like Telefonica are trying to do something about the OTT threat by simply embracing it, like with their Network-as-a-Service initiative BlueVia and their Viber-like client, called O2 Connect. They are amongst the most innovative of carriers, relatively speaking. In my earlier work for Telefonica and O2 UK, the order of the day was to preach the mantra of low-friction platforms. Some success was achieved through the introduction of relatively radical platform ideas. One example is hashblue.com, the cloud storage solution with its real-time texting API. It was built in a matter of weeks, API first, using software technologies du jour, including so-called “No-SQL” storage and “trendy” languages. However, the messaging integration took up to three times longer to “implement,” by which I mostly mean configure some settings deep in the bowels of the infrastructure. A more ambitious initiative was connFu, a project to build a set of low-friction web-friendly voice and messaging APIs in a Tropo.com fashion. Indeed, it is public knowledge that Telefonica collaborated with Voxeo in the production of Rayo, a new web-friendly API for building real-time communications services. The approach was 100% “Web 2.0” and light years ahead of other carriers, yet still not aggressive enough compared with the ongoing onslaught of OTT solutions. So why isn’t it enough? Software DNA It all boils down to one thing – the rise of the developer (facilitated by all of the above trends). Carriers have always had a rocky time figuring out developers and software paradigms. Even now, they mostly continue to misunderstand how software economics really work, in general, never mind the outlying, yet tremendously influential, innovation machine of Silicon Valley, which is like a mini empire of developers. It isn’t just about app stores and their rev-share models! The software ecosystem that surrounds the Web is far more sophisticated and penetrating. Developers, by which I mean all those engaged in the ecosystem, not just the stereotypical “Garage guy” (which is how many carriers perceive them) yield increasingly significant power over the way that digital services are consumed and will be consumed in the future. This is an inescapable fact. The digital revolution is all taking place via software, up and down the stack – from new database technologies, through new operating systems, all the way up to the apps, which are mostly the tip of the software iceberg that the carriers are crashing into. Nonetheless, the band keeps on playing on the deck and the porters keep shuffling the deck chairs in vain, yet well intended, attempts to innovate. But most of this will come to nothing and the OTT guys will triumph until carriers realize that having software DNA is a necessary condition for innovating in the world of digital services that many carriers believe they occupy. This too, is an inescapable fact. – Paul [Paul Golding is originally from the UK, but now living in Palo Alto, US. He has 16 patents in mobile and is the author of several leading books about mobile apps and mobile strategy, used in top companies and universities. In his 21 years in mobile, he has been Chief Architect, CTO and various senior tech/product roles for companies across the world, from start-ups to multi-nationals.] #telcos #ott #skype #viber #mobileoperators #networkoperators

[Besides the iOS and Android platforms grabbing the industry headlines, there is an abundance of (over 25) platforms that didn’t make it. Managing Director Andreas Constantinou recounts the graveyard of dead platforms and exactly what it takes to build a successful platform today.] 2011 turned out to be open hunting season for mobile platforms, with the MeeGo, webOS and LiMo projects coming to an end. MeeGo, webOS and LiMo, together with Windows Mobile and Symbian are just the tip of the dead OS iceberg. The last 10 years have seen numerous companies launch operating systems or platforms for mobile devices, most of which have been fallen under the media radar. A brief history of dead platforms The table below lists all known mobile platforms that have died or are a ‘zombie’ (semi-dead) state – that’s all 26 of them, from Access Linux Platform to Windows Mobile. We‘ve also researched the birth and death date of each platform. Most of these platforms have been designed as software platforms, that is, aimed at reducing costs and time-to-market for handset makers, aka OEMs. Most of the platforms were provided under a software licensing model were monetized via add-on services (e.g. IXI and Danger) or kept for in-house use (e.g. Nokia GEOS). Only post-2007 did we see applications platforms, i.e. those designed to target primarily developers and offered under a zero-royalty model. For the differences between software and applications platform see our earlier post on Platforms 101 and why not all mobile platforms are created equal. Why are 25+ platforms dead? In the last decade, software platforms have failed for a combination of reasons. Cost of ownership. The cost of creating a mobile software platform should not be underestimated. Symbian was quoted as having cost over $700 million of development cost. Even for lighter platforms, a vendor is looking at a ballpark of $100 million cost over 2-3 years of initial development, plus the incremental integration cost with each new hardware platform and the long-term R&D cost to maintain the platform to a competitive level. Conflicting revenue model. Prior to the zero-royalty model introduced by Android, all software platforms were monetized through per-unit licensing in the order of $5 to $15 per unit. This obviously represented significant costs for the OEM and also competed with bundled (free) software stacks from chipset vendors like Texas Instruments’ BMI, Qualcomm BREW, Mediatek (HOpen) and Infineon RedArrow. That was of course before the mass arrival of smartphones and the abandonment of the royalty model. Lack of network effects. Even though Microsoft had pioneered the two-sided software platform strategy with Windows since 1995, the benefits of network effects in mobile platforms were not properly understood until the launch of the Apple App Store in 2008. It was Apple that proved how network effects – the positive feedback loop between app developers and users – can lead to enormous demand-side economies of scale. It was the power of well-oiled network effects that made Nokia realize that “it had to go to developers” (and not wait for developers to go to Nokia) before eventually losing the Symbian battle against Android and iOS. High adoption barriers. For a handset maker, adopting a new platform is a painstaking, multi-year process. HTC is rumored to have been working with Android since 2005 and with Windows Mobile since 2000, 2-3 years before it produced the first G1 and SPV models, respectively.  In addition, handset makers are very risk-averse (they have tough customer commitments to keep up to) and so have in most cases preferred to stick with their internal spaghetti platforms rather than take the risk of adopting a new one. The ingredients of a successful platform There are a handful of remaining software platforms today. Besides the usual suspects Android, iOS, Windows Phone and Bada, we should also consider BREW MP (still surviving), Trolltech’s Qt (an API framework acquired by Nokia in 2008 and rumoured to be soon reappearing on Nokia’s Series 40 handsets) and Smarterphone, a niche ‘smart’ operating system for feature phones recently acquired by Nokia. The chart above makes it clear what is the success factor of modern platforms. Firstly, software DNA, that is a company with resources, processes and values routed in the PC or Internet world where developers, not OEMs are the platform’s primary customer. Secondly, a successful platform vendor needs to have large pockets due to the billions of dollars in investment needed to build a stable and advanced software foundation, while attracting developers to the platform. Note that the bubble size in the chart shows last relative size of 4 quarters of vendor revenues. But the secret sauce is neither in DNA or money; it’s hidden in Stephen Elop’s famous burning platform memo: ”Our competitors aren’t taking our market share with devices; they are taking our market share with an entire ecosystem” The secret sauce behind the success of iOS and Android is how thanks to network effects (the closed loop driving users to developers and developers to users) platforms have managed to generate billions of external investment, both in the form of developer investments (time/effort) and operator investments (subsidies). It’s network effects that have created near-insurmountable barriers to entry for Microsoft who despite boasting 75,000 WP7 developers achieved only one million sales of its flagship Lumia model from its strategic partner Nokia. And whatever Bada, Tizen or any other alphabet-soup-chef tries to conjure up, they should never forget that you can’t buy developer love. You can only plant the seeds. That’s why Facebook Platform is following exactly the right strategy: take a vibrant developer community and offer it a new addressable market. – Andreas follow me on Twitter for more: @andreascon

[As 2011 draws to a close, we’d like to present the top 10 articles published on our blog this year. The lineup includes two infographics and five research reports, with topics ranging from open source governance to the impact of HTML5 to the winners and losers of the platform race. So, enjoy these great articles, enjoy your holidays and see you next year!] 10. From MeeGo to Tizen: the making of another software bubble Article by Dave Neary Just a short 1.5 years from MeeGo’s birth, Intel dumps it to shift focus to a new platform, Tizen, in partnership with Samsung. Guest author Dave Neary discusses the underpinnings of Tizen and why both MeeGo and Tizen are software bubbles Read full article… 9. The death of Flash – 8 years in the making Adobe’s decision to stop developing Flash for mobile browsers is the talk of the day – but the reasons behind Flash’s ultimate failure are not that obvious. Guest author Francisco Kattan discusses the chain of events that led to the death of Flash – a time bomb inadvertently planted by Adobe many years ago Read full article… 8. Developer Economics 2011 – Winners and losers in the platform race Who is leading in the platform race – and who’s lagging behind? Marketing Manager Matos Kapetanakis examines the flow of developer mindshare and discusses how success is measured in the app era – in part 1 of our 3-part blog series on our newly released Developer Economics 2011 report (free download here) Read on… 7. [Infographic] The Mobile Platform Race – How do mobile platforms stack up? We’re proud to present our latest infographic, The Mobile Platform Race, showcasing some of the most important findings and insights from our Developer Economics 2011 report (free download here) See full infographic… 6. Mobile Platforms: The Clash of Ecosystems We at VisionMobile have been researching and helping to educate the industry about mobile platforms for the last five years. In this time mobile software has evolved from the world of “open OS” to the world of complex ecosystems, network effects, app stores which are redefining the rules of telecom industry. Today we share much of this knowledge in our Mobile Platforms: The Clash of Ecosystems report – a critical analysis of major mobile platforms and their battle for dominance ( free download here) 5. HTML5 and what it means for the mobile industry HTML5 has been tipped to be a game-changer, with some predictiving it will take over most mobile platforms. But what is its real impact to the mobile industry? VisionMobile Research Director Andreas Constantinou evaluates HTML5 vs apps and what it means for the mobile industry as part of our newly released report (free copy here) Read full article… 4. Open Source community building: a guide to getting it right Article by David Neary Everyone – from carriers to OEMs – is busy building developer communities. But many have failed and more have seen disappointing results. Guest author Dave Neary looks at what lessons history can teach us on community building and the key DO’s and DON’Ts Read full article… 3. [Infographic] Top 5 Handset OEMs 2001-2010 Infographic by Matos Kapetanakis In the past 10 years, the handset manufacturer landscape has changed dramatically. Companies that seemed unshakable have lost ground and are gradually being replaced by new and agile contenders, borne from the PC industry. The ‘old OEM guard’ is still being driven by momentum, but as one-by-one these giants fall and smartphone adoption continues to accelerate, the battle for a spot in the top 5 leaderboard is getting more and more heated. See full infographic… 2. A new way of measuring Openness, from Android to WebKit: The Open Governance Index Article by Liz Laffan (based on Open Governance Index report) Much has been said about open source projects – and open source platforms are now powering an ever-increasing share of the mobile market. But what is “open” and how can you measure openness? As part of our new research report (free download), VisionMobile Research Partner Liz Laffan introduces the Open Governance Index – a new approach to measuring the “openness” of software projects, from Android to WebKit Read the full article – and also check out the comments section… 1. Mobile Megatrends 2011 Article by Andreas Constantinou (based on Mobile Megatrends 2011 report) In this fourth annual research presentation we take a deep dive into the many facets of change in the mobile industry; the DELL-ification of mobile, the battle for experience ecosystems, apps as web 3.0, the use of open + closed strategies to commodise + protect and how telcos can compete in the age of software. Read full article… So, here they are – the top 10 articles on the VisionMobile blog for 2011. Next year we’ve got even better things planned, starting with our two big research reports that are on their way. The Cross-Platform Developer Tools report (out in Feb 2012) and our latest Developer Economics research (out June 2012). Sign up for our newsletter and stay up-to-speed with the latest news on our best blog articles and our latest research reports.

We are proud to present our latest infographic – the Open Governance Index, measuring the relative openness of 8 major open source projects, from Android to WebKit. This infographic presents some highlights from our full report (free download here). The Open Governance Index is authored and researched by VisionMobile, and part-funded by webinos Feel free to copy the infographic and embed it in your website (embed codes below the infographic). 150 pixels wide version 500 pixels wide version 800 pixels wide version [sociable_code] #meego #eclipse #qt #opensource #webkit #linux #symbian #Android #mozilla

[This week we’re launching the biggest survey on cross-platform developer tools. The results will be available as a free report in Q1 2012. This report will address a segment that is rapidly developing as a convergence of factors has created both opportunity and demand for cross platform solutions.] [UPDATE: The Cross-Platform Developer Tools 2012 report has been published. You can download a free copy at www.CrossPlatformTools.com] With VisionMobile estimating that each app on the Apple App store represents an average investment of US$30,000 to develop, the attraction of tools that help developers target additional platforms with minimal additional investment are obvious. As regular updates to platforms can effect functionality in existing apps, it is not just cross platform development but cross platform app management that can tax the resources of many a developer and brings the need for cross platform solutions to the fore. However, on it’s own HTML5 is hampered by the slowness of the standards process and is still largely a nascent solution to the problem of cross platform development. Combined with development frameworks that help deliver a native UI experience, device optimisation and wrapper solutions. The most notable of the latter solutions is PhoneGap, ‘co-incidentally’ acquired by Adobe just before it pulled the plug on the mobile Flash plug-in.  PhoneGap and similar solutions allow web developers to wrap web code in a native shell, sell in the app stores and access native features. With that, the differences between web app and native are significantly reduced. Such hybrid apps do however have their detractors, with performance and optimisation noted as a key issue for many developers still taking the native route. But several vendors of cross-platform development tools now claim their solutions that can deliver real, native apps, with performance to match for many platforms from a single-codebase. [Take the cross-platform dev tools survey] Indicative of a new stage in the maturity of the market, recent acquisitions in the cross-platform tool space include Strobe (Facebook), Bedrock – Metismo (Software AG), RhoMobile (Motorola Solutions), Particlecode (Appcelerator) and Nitobi’sPhoneGap (Adobe). A large number of new products have also recently come to market to fill the need for cross platform, solutions. We have identified over 50 tools that are actively supporting cross-platform mobile development. We need your help to sift through the good, the bad and the ugly with your thoughts, experiences and opinions on which tools matter. So please share your knowledge and experience, and help us to help you and your fellow developers find the right tool for their needs.  Solutions on the market include: – JavaScript / web frameworks: e.g. Sencha’s Touch and jQTouch which help web apps deliver a native UI look and feel, and behaviours. – Wrappers: Allow (mostly) web apps to pose as native solutions, most notably PhoneGap. These are essentially a variation on the runtime client solutions such as used by Adobe Flex / Air. – Code generators and code translation tools: A core component of many tools – and a standalone solution in their own right as porting tools they take one set of inputs and generate code for new platforms. – Game engines: Provide a full, targeted development environment, toolset and optimised cross platform publishing facilities such as Unity3. – Development environments and mobile application platforms: Generate apps from a single codebase, often using cross platform APIs or native code extensions to access native features. Platform solutions can also leverage a stack of additional services. Solution Description Adobe Flex Application framework. Flash Builder development environment used to create Flex / ActionScript apps which run in the Flash and Air runtimes. Appcelerator (Titanium) App development platform for HTML / CSS / JS / Ruby and Python developers to publish native applications to iOS, Android, and desktop platforms AppMobi Cloud based Platform as a Service using HTML5 / CSS / JS input to create native, hybrid and web apps Bedrock (Metismo) Middleware solution: CrossCompiler converts J2ME source code to C++, ActionScript & JS or native on a range of platforms Corona Mobile development tools and framework using Lua to create iOS and Android apps DragonRad IDE with drag and drop visual design and Lua scripting, generates codebase for native apps using a project optimised runtime client Marmalade C++ and cross platform APIs are used to generate native apps for iOS, Android and desktop platforms MoSync SDK uses HTML 5, Lua or C/C++ as input language, compiles native apps with native UI for iOS, Android, Blackberry, WindowsMobile, Symbian and Java. Mono (Touch/Droid) Development toolkits using C# and .NET input, Monotouch for iOS compiles to native code, Monodroid uses a runtime environment to deliver native apps Netbiscuits Cloud based web app / site development using HTML5, CSS, JS and BiscuitML) with native UI framework & publishing platform providing add-on services for web & hybrid apps OpenPlug Using XML & CSS for UI design, JS, ActionScript etc for scripting tool set builds native self contained iOS, Android Symbian and Win Mo apps PhoneGap Uses HTML, CSS, JS, input, provides cross platform APIs and wraps web code in a native shell for distribution RhoMobile Ruby based framework for app logic and HTML for interfaces. App generator creates scaffold native apps and web apps RunRev Livecode Uses proprietary Livecode natural programming language, Can compile native standalone applications for iOS and Android Unity 3 Game engine and development environment using Mono for game logic, JS, C# and Boo for scripting, compiles to native platform code Unreal Game engine development environment and online platform services. Uses UnrealScript (similar to Java) and Unreal Kismet visual scripting system. Kony Mobile application platform using a visual editor and scripting to output platform optimised native, hybrid and web apps Sencha Touch / jQTouch JavaScript frameworks used to give web apps a native look and feel and simplify data handling for iOS, Android and Blackberry Sproutcore JavaScript framework for developing web apps with improved client side operation Worklight Mobile application platform using HTML5, CSS, JS, (which can be combined with .Net Obj c and Java) to deliver native, hybrid and web apps. While some may claim that they really are write-once, run anywhere solutions, others note that without significant additional work, that can only be the case for bloated or low-end applications. So how do they match up to the hyperbole – what are the advantages and disadvantages in the real world? So with a final word of thanks to our sponsors – Marmalade, RunRev LiveCode, Verizon Developer Community, Xamarin, AT&T, Appcelerator, Intel, MoSync, and Orange Partner – who will bring this report to the developer community, I ask you to take part in the inaugural cross platform tools survey and let us know. – Seth #crossplatformtools #survey

[Adobe’s decision to stop developing Flash for mobile browsers is the talk of the day – but the reasons behind Flash’s ultimate failure are not that obvious. Guest author Francisco Kattan discusses the chain of events that led to the death of Flash – a time bomb inadvertently planted by Adobe many years ago]. Ever since Adobe announced that it will stop developing Flash for mobile browsers, the blogosphere has been buzzing with a broad range of sentiments including “I told you so” by critics, disbelief by Flash developers, Monday morning quarterbacking by analysts, and even a petition for Adobe’s CEO to resign.  Check out also the Occupy Flash and Occupy HTML manifestos from the opposing camps. Flash is one of those topics that attract very emotional responses from both its passionate developer community and its very vocal detractors. Although I am generally an Adobe supporter, I will put emotion aside and summarize, in hindsight, what went wrong. For full disclosure, I am a former Adobe employee, but this post is based only on publicly available information. HTML5 did not kill Flash. Steve Jobs did not kill Flash. The death of Flash was caused by a time bomb planted inadvertently by Adobe many years ago. Although Flash for mobile ultimately died because Adobe did not adapt fast enough to post iPhone changes in the ecosystem, the seeds for Adobe’s failure were planted earlier on. To understand what went wrong, let’s first review what happened before the iPhone and how those events set the stage for what happened later. Before the iPhone – the Flash Lite era Back in the early to mid 2000’s, there was great demand from handset makers (OEMs) who were willing to pay for Flash Lite (the mobile version of Flash at that time) and Adobe decided to collect a per-device license fee for the software. This decision set in motion the incentives and behavior that would ultimately lead to the demise of Flash in mobile, and as I explain later in this post, will also kill Flash on the desktop. Adobe’s ambition to create a platform for delivering rich internet experiences is now doomed. A big question in many people’s minds is why Adobe didn’t just replicate the model that had been successful with PDF and the desktop Flash Player: make the runtime freely available and monetize it with increased tools revenue. Presumably this would have motivated Adobe to prioritize platform consistency over broad (but fragmented) reach. But it was not that simple. Although there was a thriving Flash Lite ecosystem in Japan (developers creating content and distributing it via the operators), Flash Lite was initially NOT used as an apps platform in other countries. Flash Lite was used in many cases by OEMs who were looking to differentiate their devices by building expressive user interfaces for the core applications (home screen, dialer, address book, messaging, call log, and others). The LG Prada is a great example of the kind of user interface handset makers could build using Flash Lite. This device featured an iPhone-like touch interface back in 2006 (demo). The Samsung D900 and the LG Chocolate are good examples also. Although these devices included Flash Lite, they did not offer an opportunity for developers to distribute Flash-based content. The implementation of Flash Lite was closed to third party developers as there was no Flash in the browser nor the ability to execute Flash-based apps. As there was no clear opportunity for developers and therefore no tools revenue to be made, it made sense for Adobe to collect a per-device fee from handset makers rather than monetize the player via the tools. Conflicting objectives: handset makers versus developers As it happens, when the opportunity to deploy Flash Lite as an applications platform presented itself later on (especially on Nokia and Sony Ericsson devices), Adobe did not adapt its business model right away. In hindsight, this turned out to be a costly mistake. At that point, there was an inherent conflict between the needs of handset makers looking to differentiate their devices and the needs of developers who needed a consistent platform across devices. As OEMs were paying the bills and the mobile team was measured on revenue, it was natural for Adobe to prioritize OEM requirements over developer requirements and to let OEMs implement Flash to meet their own needs. OEMs licensed the source code from Adobe and created their own binary implementations that were not consistent across devices. Flash Lite was used sometimes for building device user interfaces, other times for browsing Flash content, and other times for running standalone apps. In addition, OEMs did not always implement the same set of APIs creating additional fragmentation for developers. Worse yet, as the runtime was not updateable over the air, device fragmentation would only get worse with time. Lack of Distribution and Monetization Opportunities for Developers Even when Flash Lite was deployed as a platform to run standalone apps (not in the browser), there was no easy way for developers to distribute their apps. There were no iPhone style app stores at the time. Developers had to distribute their content via middlemen (aggregators) who collected a tax and who had distribution deals with handset OEMs and network operators. Worse, the OEMs and Operators did not have good merchandising channels and discovery of apps by consumers was very poor to say the least. There was no streamlined way for Flash developers to reach consumers. This was a major issue for developers as it was for Adobe. At the same time, revenue from OEMs continued to grow –shipments of Flash enabled devices were more than doubling every year– masking the severity of the problem and allowing the time bomb to continue to tick. A glimpse of hope: partnering with operators to reach consumers In an effort to create a thriving ecosystem for developers, Adobe turned its attention to mobile operators who at the time controlled content distribution via their infamous walled gardens. Working with operators was not a popular move especially with Adobe’s Web developers who were new to mobile and did not appreciate the level of control that operators had at the time. Adobe worked with several operators but most prominently with Verizon Wireless (see the April 2006 news release) which on paper was an ideal partner. As one of the world’s largest CDMA operators, Verizon Wireless had great influence over its OEMs and was able to specify the Flash runtime on its devices. Verizon Wireless also had the most successful app store in the US at the time (the BREW-based Get it Now download market). Adobe and Verizon launched two services: A Flash app download service as part of the BREW Get it Now ecosystem (see the October 2006 news) and Verizon “Dashboard” (announced in March 2007), a much more ambitious service based on Adobe’s on-device portal called Flash Cast. Both services, had issues. The BREW Get it Now offering failed because it was too difficult for developers to onboard new apps, developer revenue shares were too thin, app discovery was difficult for consumers, and Verizon moved too slowly to certify new handsets with Flash (for more on this see: Is Brew Dead? Lessons Learned). The Dashboard service failed because it took far too long to launch, missing its market window. Verizon announced Dashboard in March 2007 promising availability in the second half of the year, but the service did not see the light of day until September 2008. Even then the service was available on only one handset out of a broad device lineup available on Verizon stores. With the iPhone and Android devices attracting all developer attention by then, Flash Cast and Dashboard were too little too late. It is worth mentioning that the innovation around Flash Cast and Verizon Dashboard was quite promising. In hindsight, the service resembled many of the key attributes of the iPhone: like the iPhone, it had an App Store concept where consumers could discover and purchase widgets with a revenue share back to developers. Like the iPhone, it was designed as a walled garden with a gate keeper (the operator in this case). Like the iPhone it featured an expressive user experience as the widgets and the user interface were based on Adobe Flash. However, unlike Apple, Adobe did not have end to end control of the ecosystem and the service was late to market as a result. The service was designed for 2006, not 2008, a big difference considering the iPhone showed up in 2007 changing all the rules. Although Adobe was innovating fast, its innovation did not reach consumers in time because it relied on slow moving partners. Enter Steve Jobs and the iPhone — CONTROL-ALT-DELETE on the ecosystem The launch of the iPhone changed the mobile ecosystem so dramatically that it disrupted all incumbents in ways that were not readily apparent right away. The disruption was so great, that it favored new entrants that were starting from scratch under the new rules (Apple and Google) over incumbents who had existing market positions and established business models (Nokia, RIM, Motorola, Palm, Microsoft, Qualcomm/BREW, Symbian, Sony Ericsson, and of course, Adobe). Like many other players, Adobe did not adapt fast enough and paid the price as a result. Consider three major changes in the ecosystem and how they negatively impacted Adobe Flash: Apple caused the existing operator walled gardens to crumble while Adobe was focused on building ecosystems with operators. Consumers started dumping feature phones in favor of buying smart phones, but Adobe had focused on feature phones which represented a much larger share of device shipments (and revenue to the mobile business unit). Mobile browsing finally took off as a mainstream service, but Adobe’s mobile player did not support 100% of the desktop Flash content as demanded by Steve Jobs. As you may recall, the first generation iPhone did not have an App Store or SDK. It was all about browsing the internet (see the “internet in your pocket” ad campaign). The iPhone was the first handset with a decent browsing experience and quickly took the bulk share of mobile browsing (even though it represented only a very small share of device shipments). The lack of Flash was a glaring gap at the time. If there was ever a time that Steve Jobs needed Flash, it was in 2007 with the first generation iPhone Unfortunately Flash was not ready at the time. Because Adobe generated revenue from device shipments, it had been focused on the feature phone category which represented a much larger share of the market in terms of shipments (but nearly zero percent in terms of web browsing page views!). Neither version of the Flash Player met Steve Job’s requirements. Flash Lite did not support all the Flash content on the Internet because it had been optimized for more constrained devices and the full Flash Player did not run well on smart phones because it required the power of a desktop computer. Steve Jobs famously once said, “there is this missing product in the middle,” referring to this issue. Incredibly, Adobe did not ship the mobile version of the full Flash Player until June of 2010 (version 10.1), three long years after the launch of the iPhone! By then, the iPhone was the most popular device on the planet and Apple had shifted focus from browsing the internet to apps where Flash did not matter (recall the “there is an app for that” ad campaign). Adobe had missed the window of opportunity to be part of the iPhone. Sure, Apple could have still adopted the Flash Platform in 2010, but it was not in the company’s best interest at that time. In the end, Apple decided not to adopt the Flash Platform because Flash would limit its ability to differentiate its devices. Apple marketing was focused on the broad availability of apps that worked best on iOS. To support such positioning, Apple needed developers to target the latest set of proprietary APIs (accelerometer, compass, gyroscope, etc.) rather than write to a higher level cross-device platform that would deliver undifferentiated experiences across Apple and non-Apple devices.  This is why Apple decided to block Flash from iOS (for more on this see: Why Steve Jobs will never put Adobe Flash on iOS devices). Adobe did react to the disruption the iPhone had created and adjusted its business model, but it was too late by then. In March of 2008, Adobe announced the Open Screen Project essentially making the player free for OEMs as long as they implemented it in a consistent way for developers. To ensure consistency for developers, Adobe also began to create its own binary implementation of the player for the leading mobile platforms in the same way it had always done for Windows and Mac OS on the desktop. However, with “Flashless” iOS devices leading the charts and HTML5 adoption increasing on mobile devices and web properties, the writing was already on the wall and there was no turning back. Adobe had been unable to disarm the time bomb in time and it eventually exploded. Flash for mobile is dead, but Flash for the desktop lives on, right? Wrong! It’s pretty simple: Flash for the desktop cannot survive without mobile support. With PCs becoming a smaller and smaller share of Internet connected devices (see chart below), it’s only a matter of time before most web sites will be updated to not require Flash. It is hard to imagine many examples of web properties that would want to exclude the majority of the eyeballs on the internet by requiring Flash. Of course, web sites don’t have to remove Flash content outright. They can add logic to serve Flash content for desktops and HTML5 content for other devices. This will in fact be the case during a multi-year transition to a “Flashless” internet. As new content is created that excludes Flash, as HTML5 adoption and capabilities catch up to Flash, and as the share of PCs continues to decline, the percent of web sites that serve Flash content on the internet will approach zero, causing Flash on the desktop to die a slow death. Note that this transition began several years ago as web properties adapted to support iOS devices — which account for a whopping 62% of mobile browsing page views! YouTube, one of Adobe’s flagship references already added support for HTML5, dealing Flash a major blow. jQuery, a popular JavaScript library that competes with Flash for building interactive sites has already overtaken Flash. The tide on HTML5 is turning and it’s only a matter of time before Flash on the desktop suffers the same fate as its mobile sibling. To recap, the seeds for Adobe’s failure with Flash were planted many years ago with a revenue model that made sense at that time, but remained as a ticking time bomb for far too long. The model caused Adobe to move in a direction that was opposite to where the market ultimately moved to, especially after the launch of the iPhone (feature phones versus smartphones, OEM requirements versus developer requirements, operators as channel versus Apple and Google as channel). In addition, when the iPhone was launched, Adobe moved too slowly to adapt to the new market reality (3 years to launch Flash Player 10.1), ultimately killing Flash. What do you think? What do you believe went wrong with Flash in mobile? Do you think Flash will survive on the desktop? – Francisco [Francisco Kattan has worked in the mobile ecosystem for over 10 years, including as Director of Product Marketing and Developer Relations for Adobe’s Mobile Business Unit. He also held leadership roles at Edify, Openwave, and currently Alcatel Lucent where he is Senior Director of Product Management. Follow Francisco on Twitter @FranciscoKattan] #Adobe #flash #flashlite #iphone

[Google’s strategy is all about ads, not selling services. Business Analyst Stijn Schuermans examines Google’s three-pronged strategy for making money and the key drivers for the company’s success] Is Google a technology company? Well, sort of. Despite its geeky, engineering-driven reputation, Google is in the first place an advertisement business, as an overwhelming 96% of its revenues come from digital ads. Sure, Google produces some amazing high-tech stuff, spending $3.7 billion in R&D in 2010, but it’s all in the name of crude commerce; of connecting eyeballs to ads. Let’s explore the three pillars of Google’s strategy that enable the company to sell more ads for more money. Google increases its reach by flattening any obstacle that stands between its ads and eyeballs. Then, Google expands its visibility to the user by providing services, creating more opportunities to show ads. Finally, the company squeezes the maximum out of those opportunities by mining user data, which allows them to understand and target users very efficiently. This strategy works pretty well for the company, to say the least. Google ranked 92nd in the 2011 Fortune 500. The company is worth almost 200 billion USD. Last year, it reaped over $29B in revenue. If Google were a country, it would be bigger than Cyprus or Bahrain, based on GDP. Since its business is digital, it collected a net profit in 2010 of $8.5B (a healthy profit margin of 27%), despite providing almost all of its user-oriented services for free. Let’s discuss Google’s three-pronged strategy in more detail. Pillar 1. Flatten The first pillar of Google’s strategy is to crush down anything that stands between consumer eyeballs and Google’s inventory, i.e. the ads that Google’s advertiser customers are providing. That is, any friction for users to be exposed to the ads should be removed. For example, Google provides two operating systems, both immensely complex technologies, at low or zero cost to the world: Android (for smartphones and tablets) and Chrome OS (for netbooks and set-top boxes). Of both operating systems, open source versions are available for anyone to access, develop and build derivatives from. Google provides OS’s like Android for free, because its goal is to commoditize the devices they will run on. They allow OEMs to make high-quality, low cost devices, which can then be delivered at a very affordable price to the mass market. If more people own and use smartphones and tablets, the reasoning goes, this gives Google more opportunities to reach those users and serve them ads. In the same context, Google took a very active stance in the net neutrality debate. There the intention was to ensure optimal access of users to the network. It would not be good for Google’s business if operators would impose restrictions of artificially increase the cost of network access. The theoretical basis for this pillar is the economics of complements. A good analogy is cars and fuel. If the price of fuel goes down, the demand for cars will increase. The services that Google provides are the complements in this case (the fuel) to the core advertisement business. The value of the advertisement inventory increases with the amount of people that Google can reach. Services are subsidized to drive more eyeballs to Google: the price of the service is reduced (in most cases to zero) to indirectly push up the demand for the core product, being ads. Pillar 2. Expand Once lots of people have access to the Internet through connected devices, Google’s second goal is to expand its footprint across the user journey. Put simply, Google wants to be part of as many use cases as possible, since that’s where they can present users with advertisements. Google provides dozens of different services, targeting as many tasks as possible that a user might consider when communicating or looking for information. If a user wants to send email, there’s GMail. For chatting, Google Talk and Google Voice. Want to find directions? Use Google Maps or Google Earth. YouTube allows you to publish your own videos and Picasa to share pictures. In a business setting, Google Apps (like Google Docs) allow you to collaborate with co-workers. If you want to keep up to date with your friends, there’s Google+. The list goes on. In most of these services, Google ads are displayed. Unobtrusively, but always there for people to see. Google doesn’t do all the work of reaching users itself. Google provides infrastructure for others to display ads, deriving about 30% of its advertisement revenue this way. Third parties can display ads on their websites (and share in the profits) using the AdSense platform. A similar system is in place to include ads in mobile apps. Despite some competition, Google is still the main advertisement provider on the Android Market. In fact, most developers on Android use advertisement as a source of income, rather than direct payment. The Android market has the lowest amount of paid apps of any app store. Pillar 3. Mine Finally, after flattening and expanding, Google squeezes the maximum out of the eyeballs it reaches. The company increasing the value of its ads by data-mining the user’s behavior. By understanding what the user is trying to achieve at the moment that an advertisement is displayed, the ad can be micro-targeted to be incredibly relevant to that user. This increases the probability that the user will click on the ad, measured by the combination of fill rate and click-through rate (CTR), and therefore the probability that she will eventually buy the advertised product. This is what makes the ad valuable to the advertiser. In its early days, Google revolutionized the advertisement industry this way. Before, an ad was broadcast to a very large audience (think billboards or TV ads) in the hope that someone might find it interesting. Any targeting was crude at best, for example an advertiser could choose to print in magazines with very specific audiences. When Google Search came along (still its flagship product), all of a sudden you could target users almost perfectly, as they conveniently typed in what they were looking for. This made the return on an advertisement spend several factors higher. A typed search query is only one way that Google can find out what a user is interested in. Scanning the content of emails is another, pretty controversial one. More recently, Google has tried to launch several social networks like Facebook-competitor Google+, hoping to learn something about the user through his social interactions. In fact, social networks are major competitors to Google for online advertisement dollars. With Google Latitude, the company can understand where you are and select advertisements that are relevant to your location. Many industry sources also confirm that the Android OS is used to collect user information. Conclusion Google doesn’t give away all its consumer services for free out of the goodness of its heart. Its purpose is to make profit. If services are provided for free, they are meant to flatten, expand and mine in order to sell advertisements. Google uses complements everywhere. Where other products might have a single or a just a few complements (think fuel for a car), Google works hard to create as many as possible. Because the core business is to reach people, Google throws its nets as wide as it can. Once it has the user’s attention, it can then use its technology to monetize the opportunity to its maximum extent. – Stijn follow us on Twitter @visionmobile [Want a more detailed analysis of Google’s strategy and how it fits into the ecosystem puzzle? Check out our Software Economics seminars]. #Android #chrome #google #mobilestrategy

[We at VisionMobile have been researching and helping to educate the industry about mobile platforms for the last five years. In this time mobile software has evolved from the world of “open OS” to the world of  complex ecosystems, network effects, app stores which are redefining the rules of telecom industry. Today we share much of this knowledge in our Mobile Platforms: The Clash of Ecosystems report – a critical analysis of major mobile platforms and their battle for dominance – free download here]. In the report the Mobile Platforms: Clash of Ecosystems (free download here) we break down  Android, BlackBerry OS, BREW, iOS, Symbian, Windows Phone and webOS across key elements such as history and origins, owner agenda, ecosystem adoption, market penetration, technology foundations and application development experience. Clash of Ecosystems is part-funded by webinos,  a project aiming to deliver an Open Source Platform and software components for web applications across mobile, PC, home media (TV/set-top boxes) and in-car devices. The report dives into several key trends underpinning the era of mobile platforms and ecosystems – designed to help developers, software companies, entrepreneurs, enterprise CIOs, brands, handset makers and operators to better understand the dynamics of mobile platform competition on intersection of economics and technology. Smartphones go mainstream, but the devil’s in the details. Just two years ago, smartphones were viewed as expensive toys for geeks and Apple fan boys. No longer. Smartphones have entered the mainstream in developed markets, and are taking a growing proportion of device sales in more cost-sensitive markets around the globe. In the third quarter of 2011, smartphone shipments penetration surpassed 29% globally, although this figure varies widely from nearly 65% in the USA and over 50% in Europe to 19% in Asia-Pacific, 17% in Latin America and 18% in Africa/Middle East. The leaders, iOS and Android, are driven by economics of demand. Handset sales are driven not by hardware features (“what the handset can do”) but the user interface and applications available (“what you can do with the handset”). Much like any smartphone platform, iOS and Android are driven by economics of demand, where the demand generated (incl. the number of applications) has a far stronger effect on sales than pure supply chain efficiencies. As of October 2011, iOS and Android are leading the way, with over 500,000 and 300,000 applications, respectively. The rest of the platforms trail far behind with order of magnitude less applications: BlackBerry has 35,000 applications, Windows Mobile 30,000 applications and Symbian 25,000 applications. Successful platforms are a magnet for financial investment. Application platforms like iOS and Android are able to attract huge financial investments on the part of developers, investors and brands. Taking iOS as an example, and estimating that an app costs an average $30,000 to develop, the 500,000 iOS apps represent an average investment of $15B in the iOS ecosystem. This investment directly contributes to Apple’s bottom line, and its estimated $71B iOS-powered device sales. App stores are about controlling ecosystems, not profiting from content. The app store business is the polar opposite of the telco content business. As such, application stores like Apple App Store and Google Android Market should not be mistaken for profit centres. Instead, Apple and Google leverage app stores as ecosystem control points. With over 85% of iOS and Android downloads coming from free apps, the 30% revenue share from paid apps subsidizes the operational cost of app intake and distribution, which runs at over $1.2B to date in the case of Apple. The rising star of HTML5. HTML5 has the potential to become a common bridge system across smartphone platform islands and the sea of feature phones. HTML5 is the only common app technology supported by Android, iOS, new versions of BlackBerry OS and Windows Phone platforms. With 225 million Android devices and 146 million iOS devices (UPDATE: this figure only refers to iPhones and does not include other iOS devices) sold to date, HTML5 is supported by over 371 million mobile devices today, albeit with mixed levels of compatibility. Microsoft, Facebook, and mobile operators have very different motivations but are all eyeing HTML5 as a technology that could help dis-intermediate app stores as content distribution silos, reducing the power of Apple’s iOS and Google’s Android platforms. However, in its present state HTML5 can neither challenge nor displace the leading mobile platforms. In order to become a viable alternative, HTML5 needs to move beyond being just a development tool, and to converge around a dominant solution for web application discovery, monetisation, distribution and retailing. Mounting developer acquisition costs. Platforms need apps to thrive and developers are the growth engine of the smartphone ecosystems. At the same time, developer attention is scarce; developers are very critical “platform consumers” and need to make far higher investments when adopting a new platform. We estimate that the minimum acquisition cost for a publishing developer is over $2,300 in the case of Apple. As such, Apple, Google, Nokia, Microsoft and RIM have needed to invest billions of dollars in persuading developers to write apps for their platforms. Moreover, developers are motivated by a complex set of incentives, which includes revenue potential, user reach, ability to raise funding, and the pure coolness or utility of a platform. These incentives vary widely across different types of developers and as such call for developer segmentation as a critical cornerstone of any developer strategy.. Software players put mobile operators on the defensive. The app innovation unleashed by smartphones puts pressure on traditional telecom profit centres, not only around value-added services, but also on core messaging and voice services. Apple and Google combined control the user experience of nearly 400 million users through their iOS and Android platforms. Both are strategically reducing the role of mobile operators to that of “connectivity providers”.  Internet giants like Facebook and Amazon are using social-centric and retail-centric strategies to profit from mobile. Startups such as Foursquare and Instagram have pioneered mobile-first services. Communication companies like Skype, WhatsApp and Viber put pressure on core telecom services, notably SMS and voice. Incumbent mobile platforms lose to next-generation challengers. In the last decade we‘ve seen over 20 mobile platforms rise and then die not being able to achieve critical mass. Next-generation platforms (iOS, Android and Windows Phone) have achieved sustainable growth by leveraging on network effects and developer economics. Legacy platforms on the other hand (Symbian, BlackBerry OS, BREW and Windows Mobile) have been designed to handset vendor rather than developer requirements; all have either been discontinued or pushed into narrow market niches. Companies with strong software DNA (common in the US) now dominate the smartphone platform landscape. Patent wars. Apple and Microsoft are trying to leverage their own patent portfolios and paying billions of dollars in patent acquisitions in an attempt to slow down the meteoric growth of Android. Apple’s strategy is to block Android sales starting with Samsung, although with mixed, regional and temporary successes. Microsoft is using an altogether different tactic, namely patent taxes, to coax OEMs like Samsung and HTC away from a higher-cost Android. At the same time, Google is planning to defend Android through the pending acquisition of Motorola Mobile Devices, and its portfolio of over 17,000 patents. We expect a culmination of the patent wars in a multi-vendor consortium designed to standardise cross-licensing agreements across Android, iOS and WP7 handset vendors. Comments welcome as always, – Michael V #ios #webos #mobileplatforms #symbian #Android #windowsphone #Blackberry #iphone

[The era of smartphones is upon us, as penetration increases from 11% in 2008 to over 25% in 2011. But what of the remaining three quarters of the market? Marketing Manager Matos Kapetanakis talks smartphone numbers and takes a look at the elusive long-tail of feature phone shipments] Dawn of the smartphone era Smartphone penetration continues to accelerate, growing from a paltry 11% in 2008 to 20% in 2010 and climbing to 27% in H1 2011. Feature phones continue to make up the bulk of mobile shipments globally, but the revenue potential of each segment is a different matter altogether. As an example, the average selling price for Nokia’s feature phones was 39 Euros versus 144.5 Euros for their converged devices. Another parameter, namely profitability is much in favour of smartphone vendors. HTC has comparable revenues to Nokia’s successful feature phone segment, with two times the profits and profit margin, despite having six times fewer shipments. The gap is even larger in the case of Apple, whose profits are nearly 20 times those of Nokia’s feature phone segment, despite having less than a third of Nokia’s shipments. Smartphone platforms: Google vs. Apple First, let’s take a look at the two leading players, Android and iOS. The vacuum left behind by Symbian’s timely demise has been filled primarily by Android and, to a lesser extend, Apple’s iOS. In H1 2011, Android gobbled up nearly 45% of the smartphone pie, leaving approximately 20% for Apple’s iOS and 12% for RIM’s BlackBerry OS. Apple has enjoyed a healthy increase of iPhone shipments in 2011, already reaching past the 50M full-year figure for 2010 in the first three quarters of 2011. Despite the initial disappointment of not being a brand-new iPhone, the iPhone 4S managed to get 4 million sales in just one weekend – that’s more than Windows Phone manages in an entire quarter. However, in an increasingly price sensitive smartphone market, there is a limit to how many iPhones can be sold. Despite being the number one smartphone platform, Android is not guaranteed a smooth sailing. Apple’s lawsuit barrage on Samsung, the biggest Android vendor in terms of sales, has exposed the platform’s Achilles’ heel, namely patents. The large arena of this high-stake drama will not be set in Germany or Australia, but the large smartphone markets, like the U.S. Google’s acquisition of Motorola (don’t miss our full analysis) has indeed armed Google with fresh patent ammunition, but might alienate the big Android vendors. Smartphone platforms: The best of the rest But what of the other platforms? Windows Phone continues to fail to impress users, with sales being disappointing, as Ballmer himself recently admitted. Nearly eight months after the much-vaunted Microsoft-Nokia deal, Windows Phone is faced with lukewarm results, being outsold even by Samsung’s bada platform. In H1 2011, Windows Phone barely reached 4M shipments, while bada shipments climbed to nearly 8M. WP7’s growth, after it replaces the zombified Symbian as Nokia’s main smartphone platform, is still uncertain, but the longer it takes for Nokia WP devices to hit the shelves, the more market share will Nokia lose. In H1, even if Nokia were to magically replace all Symbian handsets with Windows Phone handsets, Microsoft’s platform would still be far behind Android, with just half of Android’s shipments. Windows Phone, however, should not be summarily disregarded, as Microsoft has managed to create a substantial ecosystem around the platform, which is the main ingredient to the success of Apple and Google. Windows Marketplace reached the 30 thousand apps milestone in just 10 months, while the platform has received positive reviews by developers. The platform is widely acknowledged as having the best developer tools in terms of features, based on our Developer Economics 2011 report (www.DeveloperEconomics.com). Even though Stephen Elop described the smartphone market as a three-horse race, there is another important player to be considered, namely RIM. During the past year, RIM has suffered a number of blows, from declining market share and repeated drops in their share price to a total service blackout that lasted four days. RIM is starting to lag behind its competitors and their leaking market share is up for grabs. Despite a vibrant developer community, problems such as fragmentation issues and an aging platform have cost RIM the creation of a healthy ecosystem. A telling sign is how BlackBerry App World is lagging behind not only Apple and Google’s app stores in terms of available apps and downloads, but also Nokia’s Ovi Store. Now, the BlackBerry blackout fiasco has cost RIM the confidence of 70M subscribers. RIM is on the verge of relinquishing their last remaining competitive advantage, namely reliability. Even though RIM is trying to turn the situation around, with the introduction of the BBX platform, plus the carrot of Android apps compatibility in the second version of Playbook, it’s the RIM brand that has taken a beating, more than the BlackBerry brand. It remains to be seen whether users will flock to the notoriously unsafe Android platform or will opt to follow the safer, iPhone route. The iPhone route seems more suitable to RIM’s enterprise segment, as the segment’s disposable income is enough to carry the weight of expensive iPhones. Smartphone vendor arena In H1 2011, Apple and Samsung toppled Nokia as the undisputed king of smartphones. The top-5 smartphone vendor rankings also include RIM and HTC. It’s no surprise that 3 out of the top 5 players are purely smartphone vendors; but the old guard is catching up. Although lagging behind, LG is finally on board the smartphone express, while Sony Ericsson has disowned their feature phone heritage and plan to become a smartphone-only vendor in 2012. As smartphone prices are dropping, ZTE and Huawei are also firmly in the game, extending well past their native home market. It’s interesting to note that in a market of 208 million smartphones in H1 2011, there are very few dark horses. The top 10 players accounted for nearly all smartphone shipments in the first half of 2011, leaving just 3% of shipments in the ‘other’ category. The elusive long-tail of mobile shipments While Nokia has lost the pole position in the smartphone market, it continues to firmly hold the feature phone market in its grasp. Nokia accounted for over 27% of total feature phone shipments in H1 2011, followed by Samsung with 20% and LG with 7%. However, the feature phone market is extremely fragmented, with the top 7 players accounting for just 64% of shipments. The remaining x% belongs to the generic ‘other’ category. But what is this dark, elusive gap in the market? The answer lies in the plethora of primarily Asian phone manufacturers out there (see a slightly out-of-date list here), taking off-the-shelf MediaTek hardware designs to create Shanzai handsets for the Chinese market or brand name handsets for India. The long tail of feature phone manufacturers largely caters to local markets, in partnerships with local telcos. India and China are the obvious examples of low-volume feature phone manufacturers, with each country playing host to over 15 such companies. With tens of companies shipping low-end devices to local markets, it’s small wonder that the biggest bulk of feature phone shipments comes from the long-tail of handset OEMs. The end of feature phones While smartphone penetration continues to increase, just over 1 in 4 mobile phones are smartphones. The tipping point will come when handset OEMs manage to release low-cost smartphones into the market, in high volumes. Google is already attempting to sell cheap smartphones in the range of $100 unsubsidized, pre-tax. The rate of acceleration will increase even further if there is any truth to the rumors of cheaper iPhones, as consumers are still hesitant of the prices that Apple demands for its products. Furthermore, most major handset OEMs are keen to lower the volume of feature phone offers in favor of smartphones, as the latter have a much higher profit margin and the market is slowly getting accustomed to the use of touch screens. Questions or comments? Drop us a line on Twitter. Download the full 100 Million Club watchlist. – Matos #ios #zte #100millionclub #google #nokia #smartphone #featurephone #Apple #lg #motorola #symbian #Android #samsung

[Just a short 1.5 years from MeeGo’s birth, Intel dumps it to shift focus to a new platform, Tizen, in partnership with Samsung. Guest author Dave Neary discusses the underpinnings of Tizen and why both MeeGo and Tizen are software bubbles]. Eight months after Nokia embarrassed Intel by withdrawing support for the MeeGo project, Intel has followed suit. On 27th September, Intel and Samsung announced the birth of a new mobile platform called Tizen. After only 19 months, MeeGo has been left parentless, and appears to be on life support. Tizen is, in fact, a successor of the Samsung Linux Platform, a reference platform of the LiMo operator consortium, with some components taken from the MeeGo stack. Given that LiMo and MeeGo have both failed to set the mobile computing world alight, and Android has a four year head start, can we expect better things from their offspring? What has changed with this announcement? Is this Intel’s last chance to have a stake in a credible smartphone platform? And what  should Samsung, Intel and the Linux Foundation do to give their new platform a fighting chance at success? The Birth of Tizen Last year, when reviewing the progress which MeeGo had made in its first few months, we reserved judgement on the project, on the grounds that it was “too early to be able to tell how the final product will compare to iOS or Android”, but we noted that there had been some growing pains between Nokia and Intel. Those growing pains stretched to breaking point earlier this year, when Nokia finally gave up on MeeGo and turned to Windows Phone to revitalise its smartphone products. Intel was left looking for a heavyweight consumer device partner to come in and lend credibility to their claim that MeeGo was no longer a one-man show. Rumours that LG would be joining the project failed to materialise. Finally, Intel ran out of patience, and partnered with Samsung on a new platform, Tizen, to be based on SLP (Samsung Linux Platform), a platform which Samsung have previously provided to the LiMo Foundation to be used as a reference plaform for its members. While the move has obviously been in the planning for months, Samsung were perhaps encouraged to partner with Intel on the back of the news that Google has acquired Motorola Mobility in August – a view supported by their recent settlement of an Android-related patent dispute with Microsoft. In addition, as LiMo members, most notably Vodafone also ran out of patience, SLP was left as a platform without a home. MeeGo on Life Support How does MeeGo fit into the big picture now? High profile participants like GENIVI, China Mobile, Asus and Acer have committed to shipping MeeGo devices. Will they be based on the unreleased MeeGo 1.3, or the previous 1.2 release? Or will these companies move en mass to Tizen? Given the lack of reaction from partners like GENIVI, we suspect that the Tizen announcement caught these vendors unawares. Jerermiah Foster, a community manager working for one GENIVI member, informed me that his company would reuse MeeGo 1.2 in the short term, and while Tizen looked interesting, there were no current plans to move development to the platform. He also confirmed that he found out about Tizen through the project announcement, and not before. In spite of vendors withdrawing their support, part of the community is banding together to salvage their work. After Nokia pulled out of MeeGo, community developers working on the MeeGo Handset UX banded together to continue work (with several Nokia engineers) in the MeeGo Handset Community Edition, aiming to provide MeeGo support for the Nokia N900, N950 and N9 devices. In spite of the Intel announcement of Tizen, these developers have vowed to continue the development of MeeGo on ARM, and released the MeeGo Handset Community Edition 1.3 at the end of September. The current plan proposed by these developers is to create a lightweight core distribution based on Qt, under the brandname “Mer” (“MeeGo Rebooted”), on which vendors can build custom user interfaces. The MeeGo Handset Community Edition will be the first consumer of Mer’s core operating system. The MeeGo community mailing lists are full of developers wondering where they stand now. The announcement suggests that no software will be released from the Tizen project for another 6 months. According to Joel Clark, MeeGo IVI Program Manager, the MeeGo 1.3 release has been shelved, and only incremental updates to the previous 1.2 release can be expected until then. While the MeeGo community certainly has some enthusiastic community supporters, it is unlikely that any major vendors will adopt the community-supported Mer. Ironically, the move away from MeeGo comes at a time of potential wins for the project. Nokia’s MeeGo-based N9 is finally shipping, and getting rave reviews. And continued demand for netbooks has fueled the launch of several MeeGo based netbook and tablet products, including the Asus EeePC X101, the Acer Iconia M500 and other devices from Samsung, Lenovo and Fujitsu. Perhaps Intel ran out of patience just as the project was about to take off. Tizen = SLP, with a pinch of MeeGo Technically, Tizen is a successor of the Samsung Linux Platform, a reference platform of the LiMo operator consortium, with some components taken from the MeeGo stack. The project governance and infrastructure, however, will look a lot like MeeGo. According to Imad Sousou, the director of Intel’s Open Source Technology Center, and head of the MeeGo project: “in the new project, a lot of things will be the same as they were in the MeeGo project”. We also know is that the primary APIs for 3rd party developers are targeting HTML5 and WAC environments. WAC stands for Wholesale Applications Community, a set of APIs for building and delivering rich HTML5 applications, based on APIs from JIL (Joint Innovation Labs) and BONDI (a platform specified by the now-defunct Open Mobile Terminal Platform, OMTP). The Enlightenment Foundation Libraries (EFL), are also set to be a key part of the platform. We can infer two things from this: Qt will be taking a back seat in Tizen, if it is part of the platform at all, and it appears that SLP will be the basis of the Tizen platform. One thing which has not changed from MeeGo is the wide range of participants being targeted by the project. At the moment, the target audience can best be summarised as “everyone”. Tizen is aimed at platform developers, integrators, vendors, application developers, and mobile enthusiasts. That’s a very wide range of target audiences, each with different needs and expectations. Not knowing your target customer is a surefire way to throw money down the drain. Challenges, challenges, challenges Tizen’s main difficulties at this point can be broken into three groups. First, there will inevitably be teething problems between the project founders. The fact that Samsung have not yet mentioned Tizen in any press releases or announcements, and the lack of new information coming from Intel representatives since the launch announcement, suggests that there may be some communication issues to be worked out in the relationship. In fact, at this point it looks like the active partners have not yet agreed on what will and will not go into the platform. Intel and Samsung will have to work hard to overcome the cultural dissonance which is inevitable given the very different corporate DNA. On top of this, unless something changes soon, there could be a major mismatch between the reality of working with Tizen and the public positioning of the project. The project isn’t yet open for business, and when it is, it will only be useful for a small subset of its target market. If it were a new project, they might get away with it. But with the legacy of MeeGo, Moblin and Maemo, disappointing early adopters could be a very dangerous thing to do for Intel and Samsung. Getting the project governance and community dynamics right from the start is vital to learning from the mistakes of MeeGo and Moblin. Beyond the community, there are question-marks over Tizen’s potential to make an impact in the industry. Google’s purchase of Motorola Mobility, not just a patent portfolio play, has created a disturbance in the force around the Android universe. Samsung does not want to find itself competing with Google at the same as they are dependent on them for their smartphone platform. This creates an opportunity for Tizen which it is too immature to exploit. For third party developers, concentrating on HTML5 is great. But will there be a demand for a native API also? And if so, will Tizen be capable of providing the kind of unified developer experience you get on iOS or Android? It will be interesting to see if Intel and Samsung manage to get substantial support from other ARM vendors. As long as Intel are seen as the main custodians of the project, that seems unlikely. It will also be interesting to see the effect which Nokia’s first Windows Phone based devices, due to be announced at the end of October, will have on the project. The main challenge for the Tizen partners will be getting devices to market. The key constituency for the change, vendors who were committed to MeeGo before, appear to have been neglected during the announcement. Intel and Samsung need vendors to adapt the platform to sell more chips, to give breadth to the ecosystem around the project, and to give credibility in the industry that this is not a party of two. The Long Road Ahead To succeed and make a space for itself in the mobile ecosystem, execution will need to be flawless on Tizen. If the internal bickering which dogged MeeGo rears its head again, if the initial release of the platform does not meet vendor and community expectations in terms of functionality and quality, or if there is an 18 month wait for well integrated finished products running Tizen, then the project may not have a second chance to make good. Tizen seems set to be another victim of misaligned incentives across several industry partners. Samsung is bringing SLP to the “standards” table simply to find a new home for it, now that LiMo is winding down. Intel is seeking another marriage of convenience, trying to tempt a major OEM to ship significant x86 chip volumes. – Dave [Dave Neary is a regular columnist at VisionMobile writing on how companies can work more effectively with open source community projects. Dave is the founder of Neary Consulting and  has also been an active member of the GIMP, GNOME, OpenWengo, Maemo and MeeGo communities, with over 10 years of experience in open source community issues. He can be contacted at dave (at) neary-consulting (dot) com] #meego #mobileplatform #comicstrip #tizen #nokia #opensource #intel #samsung